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Comparing Political Governance: 
Southeastern Europe in a Global
Perspective
Summary
The literature on the quality of democracy, market economy and political manage-
ment in the new democracies of Southeastern Europe has raised three main doubts
and concerns. First, democracy in Southeast Europe has turned into power 
struggles among elites largely isolated from a citizenry that is increasingly disaffec-
ted with democracy and susceptible to populist and radical political forces. Second,
the institutions of market economy are undermined by the rise of the informal eco-
nomy and widening social disparities. Third, lacking safe electoral majorities and a
sufficiently realistic prospect of EU membership, liberal and Western-oriented poli-
tical actors have failed to sustain democratic and economic reforms.
This paper uses the findings of the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, a global
ranking of democracy, market economy and political management, to discuss these
hypotheses. We compare the performance profiles for Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia and
Montenegro, analyzing the trajectories of these countries over time and in com-
parison with other Southeast European, East Central European and Latin
American democracies.
The paper shows that there is an evident public disappointment with the perfor-
mance of democratic institutions, coupled with weak intermediary organizations
and significant populist or nationalist voices, but this belongs to an interplay of
mutually reinforcing defects that can also be observed in Latin American countries.
Western Balkan countries are characterized by significant informal sectors, increa-
sing social inequalities and fragile or insufficient electoral majorities for liberal
reformers, but market reforms have so far been continued and economic perfor-
mance has improved.
The management performance of Albania, Bosnia, Macedonia and Serbia for all
four management criteria is more than two points weaker than the average for East
Central Europe including Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania. This suggests that the
four problem countries from the Western Balkans not only lag behind in the
development of democracy and market economy, but also lack sufficient gover-
nance capacities to catch up with East Central Europe. Developing these capacities
appears to be the key to sustainable conflict settlements and to EU membership
strategies for this part of Europe.
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Weak societal basis
of reformers
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1. Introduction
The introductory article of this special issue has raised doubts and concerns about
the quality of democracy, market economy and political management in new
democracies of Southeastern Europe. Some observers have identified a crisis of
democracy in Southeastern Europe, consisting in the “growing gap between the
public and political elite and the growing mistrust in democratic institutions”.1
Self-contained, isolated power games within the political elite and an increasing
indifference of the public seem to reinforce each other. The widespread disaffection
with the performance of democracy may lead people to support populist and radi-
cal political forces.
Although governments have secured macroeconomic stability, externally supported
by the IMF, there are doubts as to whether the institutions of modern market eco-
nomy have fully taken root.2 The distorted economic structures that developed
during the years of war and isolation were associated with a highly unequal distri-
bution of social chances and resources. Economic reforms have increased unem-
ployment and poverty while some enterprise insiders and business groups have
managed to retain their rent incomes from cartelized markets or to convert their
political privileges into economic capital. These processes entail a widening of so-
cial disparities and are perceived as highly unfair by many people. In effect, citizens
may start questioning the legitimacy of the institutional framework that has ena-
bled them. Due to the lack of alternative employment options, many people are for-
ced to earn their living through subsistence production or in the informal economy.
“The shadow economy can be seen as an indicator of a serious deficit of legitimacy
of the present social order and the existing rules of official economic activities.”3
Those political actors that were most clearly committed to economic reform and
liberal democracy have traditionally had a weak societal basis in Southeastern
Europe. This agency problem provides an important explanation for the protracted
pathways of democratization in the region.4 Liberal reformers were not able to win
clear electoral majorities and if governments with a determined agenda of liberal
market reforms succeeded in replacing postsocialist governments dominated by
the old elites, they were regularly voted out of office, as may be illustrated by the
Kostov government in Bulgaria, the Constantinescu-governments in Romania or
the Djindjic-government in Serbia. One reason for these failures is the public
disenchantment with the reality of democracy and market economy described
above. Another reason seems to be that liberal reformers failed to convince large
parts of their citizenry that the pace and depth of domestic reform would influ-
ence the prospect of membership in the European Union, widely perceived as the
key to future prosperity.5
Drawing on these observations, we formulate three hypotheses:
(1) Democracy in Southeast Europe has turned into power struggles among elites
largely isolated from a citizenry that is increasingly disaffected with democracy and
susceptible to populist and radical political forces.
(2) The institutions of market economy – free prices and trade, open and competi-
tive markets, private enterprises and property rights – are undermined by the rise
of the informal economy and widening social disparities.
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(3) Lacking safe electoral majorities and a sufficiently realistic prospect of EU
membership, liberal and Western-oriented political actors have failed to sustain
democratic and economic reforms.
To what extent can these hypotheses be corroborated by the findings of the
Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI)? In this article, we proceed by interpreting
and comparing the BTI ratings in several dimensions. First, we perform an intrare-
gional comparison by looking at the performance profiles for Albania, Croatia,
Bosnia and Herzegovina (in the following: Bosnia), the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia (in the following: Macedonia) and Serbia and Montenegro (in the follo-
wing: Serbia).These countries have been studied in detail here and represent a selec-
tion of Southeast European countries that have experienced a protracted transition
to democracy, suffered from the Yugoslav wars and aspire for EU membership.
A second dimension of comparison is over time. We compare how the Western
Balkan countries have changed since 2003, based upon the country reports and
ratings for the previous BTI.6 This assessment used essentially the same concepts,
criteria and methods and can therefore be compared with the new BTI scores. In a
third comparative perspective, the Western Balkan countries are compared with
other Southeast European and East Central European countries. We ask whether
and how the Western Balkan countries differ from Bulgaria, Romania and the new
EU member states.
Finally, we seek to locate the Western Balkans in comparison with other regions of
the world. We focus on the Latin American democracies, because they have, in the
course of the last two decades, established democracies and reduced the share of
the state in their economies. These comparative angles allow us to assess whether
and to what extent the three hypotheses apply to all five Western Balkan countries
and distinguish this group of countries from countries in other world regions.
Before we start, two qualifications have to be made. First, the BTI ratings for Serbia
should be interpreted carefully because the ratings refer only to Serbia. One reason
for this choice is that the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro formed in 2003
possesses only weak powers at the Union level. Another reason is that the popula-
tion of Serbia is almost 14 times larger than the population of Montenegro, and the
Republic of Serbia in many respects constitutes the dominant part of the State
Union. To avoid the inclusion of ratings for Montenegro or the State Union into a
rather meaningless aggregate rating, the analysis is confined to Serbia. As Kosovo,
until 1999 an autonomous province of Serbia, is governed by a UN interim admini-
stration, an assessment of democracy, market economy and governance in Kosovo
would also blur aggregate ratings and is thus not included.
Second, the BTI ratings for Bosnia refer to the state level; democracy, market eco-
nomy and management are not separately assessed for the two entities. The role of
the High Representative of the international community is not included in the
rating. Rather, it is interpreted as a given structural condition for the management
of Bosnia’s domestic political leadership.
Defective Democracies
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2. Performance profiles of Western Balkan countries
2.1. Constitutional democracy
As explained in the introductory article, the BTI uses a broad concept of constitutio-
nal democracy and measures stateness as well as the attitudinal, behavioral and
representative consolidation of democracy. If these criteria are applied to assess the
state of development of democracy in the five countries studied here, only Croatia
can be considered a functioning democracy in the process of consolidation.The other
four countries are more adequately classified as defective democracies, ranging more
than 1.5 points behind Croatia (table 1). Their defects are most pronounced with
respect to STATENESS, RULE OF LAW, INSTITUTIONAL STABILITY and POLITICAL
INTEGRATION, while political participation rights are, by and large, ensured and demo-
cratically elected representatives have the effective power to govern (table 2).
The STATENESS ratings reflect the uncertainty over the future statehood of Bosnia,
the contestation of Macedonia’s state monopoly on the use of force by ethnic
Albanian fighters, the attacks against ethnic minorities in Serbia’s Vojvodina pro-
vince and an Albanian state lacking the capacity to ensure basic administrative ser-
vices and the monopoly on the use of force throughout the country. All four defec-
tive democracies are marred by fundamental conflicts between individual consti-
tutional organs or major political actors that are manifested in the ratings for rule
of law and institutional stability. These conflicts include the disputes between the
two republics of Serbia and Montenegro, the entities of Bosnia, the democratic and
socialist parties in Albania, and the fundamentalist opposition role of the VMRO-
DPMNE in Macedonia.
Among all four defective democracies, Bosnia is rated most problematic since its
future as an integral state is still at risk and it lacks strong intermediary organiza-
tions that would be able to bridge the ethnic divide and form societal building
blocks of a territorially based democracy. However, the improvements noted in the
country report have also led to a significant upgrading of the ratings compared to
the previous BTI that captured the state of democratic development in early 2003.
Croatia has joined the leading group of (nearly) consolidated democracies mainly
due to its high scores for STATENESS, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION and the STABILITY OF
THE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS. These ratings have improved significantly since 2003
and reflect, among other things, the fact that the country’s democratic institutions
continue to function largely without major constitutional conflicts.
Table 1: Status Index scores for Southeast European countries
Source: Selected BTI ratings.
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Public mistrust
Intermediary organizations
Table 2: State of democracy in Southeast Europe
Source: Selected BTI ratings. Best score = 10, worst score = 1. Column headings represent the criteria
outlined in the introduction to this special issue.
The country studies of this special issue and the disaggregated BTI ratings partially
confirm our first hypothesis about self-referential elite power struggles and public
disaffection threatening democracy. The reports on Bosnia, Macedonia and Serbia
cite public opinion surveys that report a high degree of mistrust towards parties and
partisan political institutions while indicating a constantly high level of diffuse sup-
port for democracy or democratic principles. Albania, Bosnia, Macedonia and Serbia
are rated as countries where corrupt officeholders can avoid sanctions by slipping
through political, legal or procedural loopholes.
The country assessments also note the weakness of parties and interest associa-
tions as institutions to aggregate and articulate citizens’ interests. In the three
countries with larger non-majoritarian ethnic groups (Bosnia, Macedonia and
Serbia), electoral behavior is shaped by ethnic affiliation. Nationalist, populist and
radical parties constitute major political actors in Bosnia, Macedonia and Serbia,
but there is also a right-wing extremist party in Croatia (HSP), representing appro-
ximately five per cent of the electorate. It is, however, difficult to assess whether we
observe a clear trend towards a strengthening of these actors as the boundaries
between mainstream and extremist parties continue to be fuzzy. Moreover, some
formerly nationalist and extremist parties – such as the Croatian Democratic
Community (HDZ), the VMRO-DPMNE in Macedonia – have undergone internal
changes and moved towards the political center.
However, the ratings also indicate that Western Balkan democracies suffer not
only from the gap between elites and citizens. In addition, their deficiencies are
equally great with respect to the RULE OF LAW, the functioning of democratic insti-
tutions and STATENESS. This shows that the hypothesized crisis of representation
coincides with other defects that can not be traced back to the causal effect of
inadequate representation alone. It seems equally plausible to assume that viola-
tions of civil rights or the insufficient independence of the judiciary have contri-
buted to public disappointment with democracy. Public disaffection and self-refe-
rential elite power struggles should therefore be seen as part of a broader syn-
drome where at least four additional factors play a causal role: stateness pro-
blems, deficits in the rule of law, frictions among political institutions and weak
intermediary organizations.
Brusis · Thiery · Southeastern Europe in a Global Perspective
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It is difficult to sustain the hypothesis of a crisis of representation for Croatia, since
the BTI scores for all five democracy criteria are more than one point higher than
the Western Balkan average (see figure 3). The consistently high scores for Croatia
seem to confirm that good performance with respect to one criterion of democra-
cy can reinforce the performance with respect to another criterion.
Figures 1-5: Performance profiles of Western Balkan countries
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Institutional framework
2.2. Socially responsible market economy
The BTI criteria measuring the state of development of market economy comprise
free, competitive markets and property rights as core institutions of a market eco-
nomy, complemented by questions on the welfare regime and sustainability that
reflect the principles of social justice and responsibility. In addition, aspects of eco-
nomic performance are measured. If the development of a market economy in
Southeast Europe is judged by these criteria, the results largely correspond to the
ratings for democratic development in the region (see table 1). Only Albania would
fall behind Bosnia, if economic performance were ranked separately. Croatia 
scores higher than the other Western Balkan countries for all seven criteria used to
assess the state of market economy (see table 3). The gap between Croatia and the
other Western Balkan countries is particularly large for the criteria measuring
SUSTAINABILITY and the LEVEL OF SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. Albania, Bosnia,
Macedonia and Serbia display deficiencies in all criteria, except for STABILITY OF
CURRENCY AND PRICES.
The relatively high scores for this criterion reflect that all Western Balkan countries
have successfully established institutional arrangements to control inflation, stabi-
lize their currency and maintain fiscal stability. The country reports of this special
issue also state that the legal and institutional framework for markets and competi-
tion has improved throughout the region. Croatia has established the most stable
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Income discrepancy
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and developed framework within the region; but improvements have also been
made by Serbia where the parliament adopted important laws on bankruptcy, a trade
register and a value added tax. All Southeast European countries concluded free
trade agreements with each other in the framework of the Stability Pact for
Southeastern Europe. All Western Balkan countries have started privatizing large
state-owned enterprises and the share of their private sector has reached 50-60 per
cent of GDP.
Albania, Bosnia and Serbia increased their gross domestic product by more than
five percent in 2004. These high growth rates were accompanied by high current
account deficits, reaching 19.1 per cent of GDP in Bosnia, and high unemployment
rates. All Western Balkan countries with the exception of Serbia were able to gra-
dually reduce their inflation rates to one-digit levels in 2004. Public deficits were
also successfully reduced and in 2004 exceeded four per cent of GDP only in
Albania and Croatia. Based upon these parameters, the economic performance was
rated very similarly for all countries, with Croatia slightly above and Macedonia
slightly below the average. Largely positive economic performance figures and the
progress of institutional reforms are reflected by the fact that all five countries
could improve their level of market economy development in comparison with the
situation in 2003, as evaluated by the previous BTI.
Per capita income, however, varies widely across the region, ranging from 4700 US-
Dollars in Albania to 10710 USD in Croatia (purchasing power parities, data for
2003). Social exclusion is marked and structurally ingrained in the poorer countries
of the Western Balkans. Structural poverty could be found in Albania, Bosnia,
Macedonia and Serbia already in the Communist period. But the main cause of
impoverishment has been the wars on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Social
safety nets are inefficient and not sufficiently prepared to cope with the structural
changes implied by a market economy. What is even more problematic in the long
term are the low ratings for SUSTAINABILITY. They imply that environmental
aspects are usually subordinated to economic development and that investments
in education, research and development have decreased significantly.
Table 3: State of market economy in Southeast Europe
Source: Selected BTI ratings. Best score = 10, worst score = 1. Column headings represent the criteria out-
lined in the introduction to this special issue.
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The country reports and ratings confirm our second hypothesis according to which
the informal economy and widening social disparities undermine the institutions
of market economy. In Albania, Bosnia, Macedonia and Serbia, approximately one
third of the labor force is employed in the informal sector. Urban-rural disparities,
disparities between regions and disparities between different ethnic groups are
significant, although they do not appear so clearly in quantitative indicators mea-
suring income disparities, such as the Gini coefficient or the quintile ratio.
Moreover, since major state-owned enterprises have not yet been restructured in
the four countries, mass layoffs, higher unemployment and regional as well as
social disparities are likely to emerge and increase in the future.
2.3. Management
The Management Index assesses the management performance of political elites
on the way to democracy and market economy. Based upon the literature on
governance and policy reforms, the management criteria measure whether the
political leadership pursues strategic priorities, acts effectively, builds a consensus
in society and cooperates with foreign and international actors. These criteria are
weighted with the level of difficulty that assesses the structural difficulties of
management. The scores for all individual criteria, the level of difficulty, the
unweighted management scores, the Management Index and the ranks are
displayed in table four.
Since the index is conceptually related to constitutional democracy and socially
responsible market economy, it is not surprising that the management ranking of
our five Western Balkan countries is similar to the ranking for the state of demo-
cratic and economic development (tables 4 and 1). Croatia leads by more than one
point on the Management Index, followed by Macedonia and, with a slightly wea-
ker performance, Albania and Serbia, whereas Bosnia clearly lags behind.
Although the level of difficulty takes into account the more auspicious structural
circumstances in Croatia compared with the other four Western Balkan countries,
the weighting does not change the relative positions of countries, as indicated by
the unweighted mean scores for management (table 4).
If the alignment of the five countries is compared with their relative positions on
the Status Index, we notice that Albania’s management performance is rated bet-
ter than its level of democracy and market economy whereas Bosnia’s distance
from the other four countries is larger on the Management Index.7 The relatively
bad management performance of Bosnia’s political elites constitutes, however, a
significant improvement compared to the period between 1998 and 2003, mea-
sured by the BTI 2003. In contrast, the management performance of Serbia’s poli-
tical leadership declined in comparison with the previous BTI that rated the first
years of the Djindjic government with its impressive initial record of reforms.
The difference between Croatia and the other four countries is evident if the four
disaggregated ratings are compared. Albania, Bosnia, Macedonia and Serbia all
receive the same scores for STEERING CAPABILITY, indicating a limited capacity for
strategic prioritization, effective implementation and learning. In Bosnia, for exam-
ple, reforms were primarily initiated by the High Representative while politicians
of the three constitutent peoples frequently opposed or obstructed reforms. In the
case of Bosnian police reforms, the Bosnian Serb members of the state government
resigned in order to protest against the implementation of these reforms.
Ethnic cleavages in Bosnia
International cooperation
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In Albania, Bosnia and Macedonia, governments are considered least effective in
using available resources, coordinating among competing objectives and comba-
ting corruption. In the cases of Bosnia and Macedonia, one of the reasons is that
inter-ethnic power sharing arrangements require the preservation of expensive
administrative structures to ensure ethnic proportionality. Regarding Albania, the
country report notes that the government and other political actors have failed to
establish most integrity mechanisms required to combat corruption effectively.
Consensus-building is particularly problematic in Bosnia, as the major parties sub-
ordinate democracy to the interests of their respective ethnic constituency. They
have failed to reduce ethnic cleavages and do nothing to promote civic engage-
ment and solidarity beyond their own ethnic community. The different communi-
ties have not yet overcome the legacy of the war and taken significant steps
towards reconciliation, although the government of the entity dominated by
Bosnian Serbs has acknowledged the mass murder committed by Bosnian Serb
forces in Srebrenica.
In Macedonia, successive governments sought to bridge the ethnic cleavage by co-
opting parties representing Macedonian Albanians. However, the campaign
against the law on the territorial-administrative restructuring showed that the
major opposition party did not fully accept the Ohrid Agreement that sought to
end the inter-ethnic conflict of 2001. Although the referendum initiated by this
campaign failed in November 2004 due to insufficient electoral turnout, opinion
polls document that a significant part of the population rejected the change of
municipal boundaries and thus a key component of the Ohrid Agreement.
In Albania, power struggles between the Democratic Party, the Socialist Party and
their recently established split-offs delayed the reform process. Croatia received
high scores for CONSENSUS-BUILDING inter alia because the Croatian prime minister
Sanader was able to include the party representing Croatia’s ethnic Serbian mino-
rity. This contributed to overcoming the legacy of violent conflict between Croats
and ethnic Serbs living in Croatia.
In contrast with Croatia, the other four Western Balkan countries were less effec-
tive in using international support to improve their domestic reform policies and
acted less reliably and credibly in their relations with the international communi-
ty. This assessment does apply mainly to political cooperation whereas economic
cooperation was characterized by effective transnational policy transfers, high reli-
ability and stability. The growing trust in the economic policies implemented by
Western Balkan governments and central banks is also documented by the increa-
sing inflows of foreign capital into the region. Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia did not
sufficiently cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia to seize and extradite indicted war criminals. Serbia’s government also
failed to cooperate sufficiently in the disputes on the future status of Kosovo and
the future of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. In Albania, partisan poli-
tical polarization and severe problems with the rule of law stalled the negotiations
on a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU. Relations with neigh-
boring countries, however, were improved by all five countries, although not all
disputes could be solved.
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Implementation of reforms
Sustainability of reforms
Table 4: Management Index scores for Southeast European countries
Source: Selected BTI ratings. Best score = 10, worst score = 1, except for the level of difficulty where 10
represents the most difficult and 1 the least difficult structural conditions. Column headings represent the
criteria outlined in the introduction to this special issue.The unweighted management scores are the means
of the criteria scores.
The country reports and ratings provide some evidence supporting our hypothesis
that liberal and Western-oriented political actors were barred from sustaining
democratic and economic reforms. The BTI ratings for STEERING CAPABILITY and
CONSENSUS BUILDING can be seen as indicators to test this hypothesis. Croatia’s
steering capability is rated higher than the capabilities of the other four countries,
corresponding to the fact that Croatia’s chances to join the EU are the best among
the Western Balkan countries. The more remote prospect of EU membership is
associated with a weaker capacity to maintain strategic priorities and to implement
reforms. Admittedly, this association does not reveal whether the main causal
effect is directed from the prospect of EU membership toward strategic priority-
setting or vice versa.
One of the questions constituting the CONSENSUS BUILDING criterion asks whether
the major political actors agree on democracy and market economy as strategic,
long-term aims. This question is rated highly for all Western Balkan countries
except for Bosnia and Serbia. In Bosnia, the formal commitment of political leaders
to democracy and market economy is subverted by opposed concepts of statehood
that guide the policies of the major parties representing Bosniaks, Croats and
Serbs. In Serbia, the basic consensus on market-based democracy is undermined
by populist political actors. The most popular of these actors is the Serbian Radical
Party which advocates, inter alia, the annexation of territories populated by ethnic
Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia. This indicates that liberal political actors in Bosnia and
Serbia lacked clear electoral majorities and faced the greatest difficulties in sustai-
ning political and economic reforms.
However, these political constellations are more auspicious in Albania, Croatia and
Macedonia and they have not significantly affected key economic reforms in any of
the five countries. This contradicts our hypothesis, suggesting that liberal econo-
mic reform policies may be shielded against those who seek or claim to represent
the losers of these reforms. In addition, the country reports and ratings may not
(yet) reflect the mid- or longterm effects of a stalled enlargement process.
Interregional comparison
Similarity to Latin 
American democracies
Brusis · Thiery · Southeastern Europe in a Global Perspective
C·A·P Policy Research · 1 · 2006 Page 15
3. A Western Balkan exceptionalism?
The performance profiles discussed in the first section have shown considerable
variety among the five countries that are compared here. How significant this
variety is, can only be measured by locating the Western Balkan countries in com-
parison with countries outside the region. Based upon the BTI data, this section
compares our five countries with the new EU member states including Bulgaria
and Romania as well as with Latin American countries. This comparison is also
intended to assess whether the three hypotheses denote specific, exceptional pro-
blems of the Western Balkan countries or more general challenges for young
democracies and emerging market economies.
The tables in the first section provide ratings for other Southeast and East Central
European countries in addition to the Western Balkans. They show that Croatia’s
aggregate ratings for democracy, market economy and the management perfor-
mance of its political elites are higher than those of Bulgaria and Romania. These
two Southeast European countries are ranked between Croatia and the other four
Western Balkan countries for 14 of 16 BTI criteria. Turkey is another Southeast
European country and candidate for EU membership whose ratings for the state of
democracy and market economy are similar to the four weaker Western Balkan
countries. The positioning of Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania suggests that these
countries might be included into a larger Southeast European cluster, rather than
focusing solely on the five Western Balkan countries.
Due to greater structural difficulties, reflected in the LEVEL OF DIFFICULTY, Turkey’s
management performance is rated higher than the performance of Bulgaria,
Romania, and Croatia’s performance turns out to be higher than Hungary’s. In
comparison with Hungary and Slovenia, Croatia’s main deficiencies concern the
rule of law (in particular its less independent judiciary) and its somewhat weaker
investment in environmental protection and education. While Croatia is indeed
closer to these East Central European countries than to the other Western Balkan
countries, there is a significant difference between Albania and Bosnia as the wea-
kest Western Balkan performers and Moldova. This Southeast European successor
state of the former Soviet Union has obtained lower ratings for the state of demo-
cracy, market economy and political management. However, the distance between
Croatia and the weakest Western Balkan country is larger than the distance bet-
ween the weakest Western Balkan country and Moldova, confirming the heteroge-
neity of the Western Balkan group.
To extend the comparison, we have calculated the BTI mean scores attained by demo-
cracies in other regions of the world (table 5). Democracies are defined as countries
in which free and fair elections take place and in which rulers are subject to a mini-
mum of constitutional checks and balances. As indicated by the shaded cells in the
table below, the Latin American and Caribbean democracies (in the following: Latin
American democracies) are assessed as most similar to the Western Balkan countries.
Four of the five democracy criteria are rated similarly for the 19 Latin American demo-
cracies assessed by the BTI.8 Of the seven market economy criteria, three criteria
referring to the institutions and structures of a market economy are rated similarly,
while ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE and SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT are considered 
higher for the Western Balkan countries. The LEVEL OF DIFFICULTY and CONSENSUS
BUILDING are the most comparable components of the management rating.
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Low scores for Rule of Law
These similarities suggest that we can find similar patterns of democracy, market
economy and management in the Western Balkans and Latin America. The table
also shows that there is a significant gap between the new EU member states from
East Central Europe and the Western Balkan countries, even if Bulgaria and
Romania are included in the former group.
Table 5: Average ratings for Western Balkan and other democracies
Source: BTI ratings, unweighted means. Best score = 10, worst score = 1, except for the level of difficulty
where 10 represents the most difficult and 1 the least difficult structural conditions. Bold figues denote
those ratings that are most similar to the Western Balkan averages. Note that only democracies in countries
with more than three million inhabitants are included.
This gap is most dramatic for the management, RULE OF LAW, MARKET AND
COMPETITION, PRIVATE PROPERTY and SUSTAINABILITY criteria. These differences bet-
ween East Central Europe and the Western Balkans put our three hypotheses in a
different perspective. If viewed from East Central Europe with its successful record
of democratic consolidation, the main problem of the Western Balkan countries
seems to be the low level of the RULE OF LAW, not the syndrome of elite power
struggles and public disaffection with democracy. The disaggregate ratings for RULE
OF LAW point to a systematic lag existing for all four questions that constitute this
criterion (figure 6).
Institutional reforms
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Compared with East Central Europe, the greatest deficiencies are not related to
social disparities, reflected in the SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT and WELFARE
REGIME criteria, but the more complex institutional reforms required to improve the
quality and competitiveness of a market economy, such as privatization, establi-
shing a market-oriented regulatory framework or reforms of education and infra-
structure. The eroding impact of the informal economy in Southeastern Europe is,
however, manifested in the large divergence with respect to MARKET AND
COMPETITION. Comparing the management ratings for East Central Europe and the
Western Balkans reveals systematic deficiencies affecting all four criteria. STEERING
CAPABILITY and CONSENSUS BUILDING, the criteria reflecting the extent to which
democratic and economic reforms are sustained, are not assessed significantly
weaker than RESOURCE EFFICIENCY or INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION (figure 7).
Figure 6: Rule of law ratings for Western Balkan and East Central European countries
Figure 7: Management ratings for Western Balkan and East Central European countries
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“Latinization” or
Europeanization?
If the Western Balkan countries differ so much from the East Central European
countries, Bulgaria and Romania, do they have more in common with the patterns
of democracy and market economy in Latin America? Can we observe a
“Latinization” rather than a Europeanization of the Western Balkans? Many Latin
American democracies are characterized by unfulfilled social expectations, weak
structures of political representation, populism, bad governance and the general
weakening of reform dynamics (“Latin disease”) While the aggregate ratings sup-
port the impression of a similarity between these two regions, an analysis of the dis-
aggregate scores reminds us of the divergent composition of several criteria ratings.
Although the mean scores for STATENESS are identical in the two regions (8.3), the
disaggregate scores show that Latin American states have more difficulties in exer-
cising their monopoly on the use of force and ensuring working administrative
structures throughout the country (figure 8). These problems, which have their ori-
gins in the colonial era and in the structure of Latin American societies, were not
resolved during the different waves of modernization and affect all countries with
the exceptions of Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica and Jamaica. Western Balkan states, in
contrast, are characterized by more severe nationality conflicts and churches exer-
ting political influence. If the disaggregate scores for CONSENSUS BUILDING are ana-
lyzed, we find that anti-democratic veto players appear to be less problematic in
Western Balkan states, perhaps reflected in the broader or more stable agreement
among major political actors on the aims of democracy (figure 9). On the other
hand, political elites in the Western Balkans have had more difficulties in managing
societal cleavages and in achieving reconciliation for the war crimes and injustices.
Figure 8: Stateness ratings for Western Balkan and Latin American democracies
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Figure 9: Consensus building ratings for Latin American and Western Balkan countries
The disaggregate scores for the other management criteria as well as for
PARTICIPATION, STABILITY and POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION are, however, quite
similarly structured. These findings tend to confirm the general similarity between
Latin American and Western Balkan countries. This implies that our hypothesized
representation crisis can also be observed in Latin American democracies and thus
appears to denote a general challenge for new democracies. However,“state weak-
ness”, seen as an important determinant of the representation crisis in the Western
Balkans, is configured differently in Latin America. Our third hypothesis about the
failure of reform-minded elites to sustain democratic and economic reforms seems
to apply better to Latin American countries, if the ratings for the agreement on
democracy and market economy and for strategic prioritization are taken as pro-
xies for this management capacity. The Latin American democracies score lower
than the Western Balkan countries on both questions.
The variance among Latin American democracies might be too great for a serious
comparison with Western Balkan countries. However, the general similarity can be
confirmed if we take a closer look at subregions. The BTI profile of the Western
Balkan states is closer to Central America than to the more developed Southern
Cone of Latin America or to the Andean region (see table 6). Concerning the trans-
formation management, Croatia is rated closer to Costa Rica and even Chile than
to other Latin American states, although there is no Latin American country with
exactly the same management profile. In contrast, the performance of the other
four Western Balkan countries is similar to the five Central American countries stu-
died by the BTI (excluding Costa Rica).
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Risk of a “Latino syndrome”
Threats to market economy
Table 6: Management Index scores for Western Balkan and Central American countries
Figures in bold denote most similar scores. CA 5 = El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama;
WB 4 = Albania, Bosnia, Macedonia, Serbia
Regarding the state of democracy and market economy, the similarity is distorted
by a well-known “Latino syndrome”, namely the social disparities, extreme pover-
ty and lacking welfare mechanisms that affect the region as a whole. This does not
apply to Costa Rica, whose welfare regime and social standards are clearly above
the Latin American average. Costa Rica’s scores for democracy and market econo-
my closely resemble Croatia’s scores, except for the RULE OF LAW and THE STABILITY
OF CURRENCY AND PRICES (see tables 7 and 8). In sum, the Western Balkan countries
are still profiting from higher levels of development and welfare, but their trans-
formation management leaves some doubt if they are able to meet citizen’s
demands and expectations. They should be cautious not to be affected by the
“Latino syndrome”which is easy too enter but difficult to escape.
Table 7: State of democracy in Croatia and Costa Rica 
Table 8: State of market economy in Croatia and Costa Rica
To test our second hypothesis about the erosion of market institutions, we compa-
re the Western Balkan countries with 41 countries at comparable levels of gross
national income per capita in 2003 (purchasing power parities). We set 4000 USD
as the lower and 12000 USD as the upper limit, roughly corresponding to the levels
of Albania (4700 USD) and Croatia (10710 USD). This comparison shows that the
market economy ratings of Western Balkan countries are higher than the average
of other economies with similar income levels, but their performance profiles are
quite typical for economies at this level of development (figure 10). We may there-
fore conclude that the weakening of market economy institutions by a shadow
economy and by widening social disparities appears to be a more general pheno-
menon that can be observed in economies at intermediate income levels across the
world, even if the conditions, dynamics and effects may vary widely.9
Development gaps
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Figure 10: Market economy ratings for Western Balkan and comparable BTI countries
4. Conclusion
Underscoring the variety of Western Balkan countries, our multidimensional com-
parison has provided a qualified confirmation for our three hypotheses. There is an
evident public disappointment with the performance of democratic institutions,
coupled with weak intermediary organizations and significant populist or nationa-
list voices, but this belongs to an interplay of mutually reinforcing defects that can
also be observed in Latin American countries. Moreover, problems with the rule of
law seem to make the key difference between the Western Balkans and the new EU
member states from East Central Europe if the average ratings for both regions are
compared. These problems comprise the independence and interdependence of
state powers including an independent judiciary, the effective sanctioning of public
officeholders misusing their positions to further their private interests and the
effective protection of civil rights.
Western Balkan countries are characterized by significant informal sectors, increa-
sing social inequalities and fragile or insufficient electoral majorities for liberal
reformers, but the country reports also note that market reforms have been conti-
nued and economic performance has improved. In comparison with East Central
European averages, the BTI ratings display relatively larger development gaps with
respect to SUSTAINABILITY, PRIVATE PROPERTY and MARKET AND COMPETITION. The
agreement among major political actors to establish democracy and market eco-
nomy is considered broader and more stable than in Latin America. This seems to
be causally linked with larger social disparities and a lower level of socioeconomic
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development in Latin America, which have become politically more salient during
the last years, especially in the Andean region.
Whether the political leaders of the Western Balkan countries sustain democratic
and economic reforms or whether Europeanization prevails over tendencies
toward “Latinization”, can be fully assessed only by future studies that can take
into account the social and political impact of the challenges ahead, namely the
restructuring of large publicly owned enterprises and a stagnating enlargement
process.
However, what is obvious from this edition of the BTI is the persistent gap between
East Central European and the four poorer Western Balkan countries. The manage-
ment performance of Albania, Bosnia, Macedonia and Serbia for all four manage-
ment criteria is more than two points weaker than the average for East Central
Europe including Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania. This suggests that the four pro-
blem countries from the Western Balkans not only lag behind in the development
of democracy and market economy, but also lack sufficient governance capacities
to catch up with East Central Europe. Developing these capacities appears to be
the key to sustainable conflict settlements and to EU membership strategies for
this part of Europe.
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